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Enforcing Environmental Law in an Unequal Market:
The Case of Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations
By Paul Stokstad'
Introduction
Regulators enforce environmental laws by imposing civil penalties
on violators.2 Penalties deter because a company that knows it is liable for
penalties has a financial incentive to avoid violations. But sometimes more
than one party is involved in a pollution-generating activity. A plant
manager might order an employee to dispose of waste improperly. A
parent corporation might direct its subsidiary to skirt a condition of its
environmental permit. In such situations, a central issue in the
enforcement of environmental law is to determine who is subject to
penalties.
This article deals with one such situation, in which one corporation
(typically large) hires another corporation (typically small) to engage in an
activity that produces pollution. If the small corporation violates
environmental law while engaging in that activity, it will be liable for
penalties. But should the law make the larger firm jointly responsible for
the environmental violations committed by the smaller? Many questions
jump to mind. Is it fair to impose penalties on the larger corporation, even
though it did not itself pollute? Will making the larger firm liable for
1 J.D. Boalt Hall, 1997; Trial Attorney, Environmental and Natural Resources Division,
United States Department of Justice, 1999-2005; Visiting Professor, Michigan State
University College of Law, 2005-07. I am grateful to Michigan State University College
of Law, which provided financial support for this research; to Noga Morag-Levine and
Nicholas Mercuro, who reviewed drafts of this article; and to faculty at Michigan State
University College of Law and Wayne State University Law School, who provided
feedback during talks based on earlier versions of this article. All errors and omissions
are my own.
2 While other techniques exist-criminal enforcement, environmental self-auditing
programs, compliance assistance, and public disclosure of compliance information, for
example-this article does not address them. A thorough treatment of various
enforcement approaches can be found in CLIFFORD RECHTSCHAFFEN & DAVID MARKELL,
REINVENTING ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT AND THE STATE/FEDERAL RELATIONSHIP
59 (2003).
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penalties cause it to pressure the smaller firm to avoid violations in the
future? Does it matter whether the large firm has a bargaining advantage
over the small firm? These questions cannot be answered in the abstract.
This article examines them in the important context of the American meat-
production industry. 3
The meat industry fits the pattern just described. Once the province
of small farmers, meat production in America has come to be dominated
by a few large, vertically-integrated corporations, often called
"integrators." Their names-Tyson Foods, Smithfield, and others-are
familiar to consumers. Though these corporations are involved in most of
the stages of meat production, they do not typically raise the animals
themselves. Instead, they enter into short-term contracts with farmers to do
that for them. These contract farmers are often called "growers."4
Integrators have a strong bargaining advantage over growers. In
any given local market, there are typically only a few integrators available
to buy meat, since a handful of integrators hold a large percentage of the
market. Some economic evidence suggests that integrators hold market
power5 and have been able to use it to extract most of the profits created
by meat production, leaving growers operating at the margin.6 In the past
few years, agricultural reformers, who assert that integrators have robbed
3 "Industry" is the appropriate word. American farmers raise tremendous numbers of
animals: 8.8 billion chickens and 61 million hogs in 2006, for example. See U.S. DEPT.
OF AGRIC., POULTRY: PRODUCTION AND VALUE, 2006 SUMMARY (April 2007); U.S.
DEPT. OF AGRIC., QUARTERLY HOGS AND PIGS (June 2007). The industry has sales of $90
billion annual. See U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC., MEAT ANIMALS PRODUCTION, DISPOSITION,
AND INCOME, 2006 SUMMARY 1 (Apr. 2007) (gross receipts of $64 billion for cattle and
calves, hogs and pigs, and sheep and lambs); U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC., POULTRY -
PRODUCTION AND VALUE, 2006 SUMMARY 1 (Apr. 2007) (gross receipts of $26 billion
for broilers, eggs, turkeys, and the value of sales from chickens).
4 Although the terms "grower" and "integrator" are most common in the poultry sector of
the meat industry, this article will use them with respect to the other animal sectors as
well.
5 "The term 'market power' refers to the ability of a firm (or a group of firms, acting
jointly) to raise price above the competitive level without losing so many sales so rapidly
that the price increase is unprofitable and must be rescinded." William M. Landes &
Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REv. 937, 937 (1981).
Although this article examines integrators' ability to reduce prices for the animals they
buy, not to raise prices for the meat they sell, the principle is the same.6 See infra Section HI.A.
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them of their independence and damaged rural communities by turning
"farmers" into "growers," have offered a variety of reforms aimed at
reducing integrators' market power or preventing them from taking unfair
advantage of it.7
There is no question that meat production is a pollution-generating
activity. In the modern meat industry, the farmers contracting with
integrators do not raise their cows, hogs, and chickens in the green
pastures and picturesque barns depicted on milk cartons. They operate
large facilities at which thousands, tens of thousands, or even millions of
animals are grown in close confines. Critics sometimes call these
operations 'factory farms.8 The Environmental Protection Agency refers
to them as "Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations" or "CAFOs."9
Whatever they are called, these operations create a significant amount of
water pollution.10
CAFOs pollute water in two ways. One way is through the
spreading of too much manure on fields. On traditional small farms,
animal manure could be used as fertilizer on nearby fields. But animals
packed into CAFOs produce vast quantities of manure. Because manure is
expensive to transport, CAFO operators sometimes apply it to nearby
fields in amounts that greatly exceed what the plants can absorb. The
manure can then seep or wash into waterways, where its nutrients rob
marine life of oxygen. The other way CAFOs pollute rivers and streams is
through spills. Manure is usually stored in liquid form. Pipes carrying the
manure to the fields can burst. Manure applicators can be left on too long
or spray too close to streams. Worst, the enormous lagoons that store
manure awaiting application sometimes fail. The concentrated manure can
wipe out all life in a stream.
While CAFOs have long been subject to environmental laws, as
the industry has grown regulators have begun to pay closer attention."
EPA and the states have strengthened their enforcement efforts. New
regulations under the Clean Water Act' 2 have enlarged the number of
7 See infra Section HI.B.
8 See www.sierraclub.org/factoryfarms.
9 See infra Section II.B (for the precise regulatory definition of a CAFO).
10 See infra Section II.A.
" See infra Section II.B.
12 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2006).
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CAFOs subject to environmental controls and have limited the amount of
manure that can be applied to farmland. In the debate surrounding these
new regulations and enforcement efforts, one controversial issue stands
out: whether integrators should be subject to penalties for environmental
violations at the CAFOs with which they contract.' 3
This article explores this issue by examining how integrators'
market power can determine whether it is fair and effective to make them
liable for environmental violations at CAFOs.14 Recent economic research
suggests that the more market power integrators hold, the more effective it
will be to make them liable for environmental violations at CAFOs; one
goal of this article is to bring this economic analysis into the legal debate,
where it has not yet been given much attention.
This article also introduces a new wrinkle to the analysis. It argues
that the effectiveness of integrator liability depends not only on the extent
of their market power, but on the kind of violation at issue: manure over-
application or manure spills. The difference between them is that manure
over-application is relatively easy to prevent, so long as a CAFO is willing
to spend the money to acquire more land or treat the manure to reduce its
nutrient content. A CAFO that violates the new manure application limits
will do so only if the integrator believes that it will be cheaper to violate
the law than to pay the penalties for doing so. In that sense, manure over-
13 Agricultural reformers and environmentalists are not the only ones who have criticized
CAFOs. Animal welfare advocates lambast the often cruel conditions in which animals
are raised. See, e.g., GAIL A. EISNITZ, SLAUGHTERHOUSE (1997); DAVID J. WOLFSON,
BEYOND THE LAW: AGRIBUSINESS AND THE SYSTEMIC ABUSE OF ANIMALS RAISED FOR
FOOD OR FOOD PRODUCTION (1999). Social critics contend that CAFOs are destroying
rural communities. See, e.g., JOHN IKERD, CORPORATE HOG PRODUCTION:
THE COLONIZATION OF RURAL AMERICA (2003), available at
http://web.missouri.edu/-ikerdj//papers/HogColonalism.htm; MIGUEL I. GOMEZ, IMPACTS
OF CONCENTRATION OF HOG PRODUCTION ON ECONOMIC GROWTH IN RURAL ILLINOIS:
AN ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS (2000), available at
http://www.factoryfarm.org/docs/Gomez.pdf. Workers' rights advocates criticize the
conditions for workers at CAFOs and meat packing plants. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, BLOOD, SWEAT, AND FEAR: WORKERS' RIGHTS IN U.S. MEAT AND POULTRY
PLANTS (2005), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/usaO105/usa0105.pdf.
14 As the introduction to this point has suggested, this article is using the term "integrator
liability" to mean liability to the government for civil penalties for violation of
environmental laws and regulations, not liability to third parties for the harmful effects of
pollution.
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application is an intentional violation. Manure spills, by contrast, are
accidents. As will be explained in Section IV, when integrators hold
market power, integrator liability is more effective at preventing accidents
than at deterring intentional violations.
Section I of this article begins with a brief description of the CAFO
industry. Section II outlines the environmental problems CAFOs cause,
and the steps the legal system has taken to attempt to alleviate those
problems. Section III describes the significant inequality in bargaining
power that exists between integrators and growers, explains why that
imbalance exists, and details some steps that have been and could be taken
to rectify that market imbalance.
Section IV, the heart of this article, discusses two issues. The first,
as described above, is whether integrators' market power should affect
environmental regulation; in particular, whether integrators should be
liable under the Clean Water Act for pollution from CAFOs with which
they contract. The second issue addressed in Section IV is whether market
reforms-both those aimed at diminishing integrators' market power and
those intended to ameliorate the effects of integrators' market power on
growers-will affect the ability of regulators to improve the
environmental performance at CAFOs. The article concludes with some
brief recommendations.
I. The Structure of the Meat-Producing Industry
The poultry sector adopted the CAFO model in the years following
World War II. More recently, the hog and cattle sectors have begun to
follow suit. The transformation has been dramatic. The number of farms
has plummeted. Taking hog farming as an example, of the 870,000 hog
farms in the United States in 1970, only 73,600 remained by 2003.
Meanwhile, the number of animals per farm has skyrocketed. The average
number of hogs raised on a farm has increased more than tenfold, from 73
in 1970 to 821 in 2003.15 Today, by EPA's count, there are about 18,000
1s National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit Regulation and Effluent
Limitations Guidelines and Standards for Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations, 66
Fed. Reg. 2960-01, 2974 (proposed Jan. 12, 2001) (hereinafter 2001 Proposed CAFO
Rule). Looking at farms that raise broilers (chickens used for meat), the average number
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facilities in the United States that meet the regulatory definition of a
Concentrated Animal Feeding Operation.' 6 CAFOs are now the dominant
way meat is produced in the United States.'
Two economic characteristics of the industry are particularly
important for purposes of this article: the substantial concentration of the
industry, particularly in meat processing, and the rising use of production
and marketing contracts between independent growers and large,
integrated corporations.
A. Concentration and Integration
The meat-raising industry is concentrated both vertically and
horizontally. Vertical integration exists when a firm operates at multiple
levels of a production chain. In the meat industry, the levels of production
include growing and processing feed grain, raising animals, slaughtering
them, and packaging and marketing their meat. Vertical integration has
been increasing over the past decade, with large companies known as
"integrators" beginning to be involved at many or all of the various stages.
This vertical integration is most pronounced in the poultry industry,' but
the hog and cattle industries have been catching up since the 1990s.19 For
example, in 2005, Cargill was among the largest four firms in the
production of animal feed, the raising and slaughter of cattle, and the
of chickens has grown from 73,300 birds in 1974 to 281,700 in 1997; 1997 the average
number of cattle and milking cows grew from 80 to 250. Id.
'
6 See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT NATIONAL
PRIORITY: CLEAN WATER ACT, WET WEATHER (Nov. 2004), available at
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/Publications/data/planning/priorities/fy2005pri
oritycwastorm.pdf.
17 CAFOs accounted for 80 percent of the total revenue from the production of livestock
in 2001. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, LIVESTOCK AGRICULTURE: INCREASED
EPA OVERSIGHT WILL IMPROVE ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAM FOR CONCENTRATED
ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATIONS, GAO/RCED-03-285 (2003) at 1.18 FARMERS' LEGAL ACTION GROUP, ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF INTEGRATOR PRACTICES
ON CONTRACT POULTRY GROWERS (Sept. 2001) at 1-1.
'9 See JOHN CONNOR ET AL., THE BAN ON PACKER OWNERSHIP AND FEEDING OF
LIVESTOCK: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS 1 (2003), available at
http://harkin.senate.gov/specials/20020313-packer-report.pdf.
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processing of pork.20
Horizontal concentration exists when a relatively small number of
firms dominates a single stage of a production process. Both the growing
and the processing of animals are horizontally concentrated. In 2005, for
example, the top four pork integrators accounted for 49 percent of the
sows raised. 2 1 The concentration is even higher in the meat processing
sector. In 2005, the top four pork packing companies controlled 66 percent
of the market; the top four beef packing companies controlled 83.5 percent
22
of that market. Meat processing is one of the most concentrated
industries in the United States. 23
B. Production and Marketing Contracts
Vertical integration in the meat industry exists in two forms. In
"pure" vertical integration, the integrator owns its animals and grows them
itself. More commonly, integrators enter into contracts with growers who
raise the animals for them. There are two forms of such contracts:
production contracts and marketing contracts. Under production contracts,
growers raise animals owned by the integrators. The growers are paid
based on how efficiently they use feed (which the integrator provides) to
raise the animals. Production contracts usually contain detailed conditions
to which the growers must adhere. Integrators using such contracts often
require that facilities be constructed to their specifications. The contracts
tell growers how to feed, house, and medicate the animals, how to handle
manure, and how to dispose of carcasses.24 Under marketing contracts,
growers agree in advance to sell their animals to integrators under an
20 MARY HENDRICKSON & WILLIAM HEFFERNAN, CONCENTRATION OF AGRICULTURAL
MARKETS (2007), available at http://www.nfu.org/wp-content/2007-heffernanreport.pdf.
211id.
22 id.
23 Clement E. Ward, A Review of Causes for and Consequences ofEconomic
Concentration in the US. Meatpacking Industry, 2002 CURRENT AGRIC., FOOD & RES.
ISSUES No. 3, at 1, available at http://cafri.usask.ca/j_pdfs/ward3-1.pdf.1.
24 See NEIL D. HAMILTON, A FARMER'S LEGAL GUIDE TO PRODUCTION CONTRACTS
(1995). See also Farmers' Legal Action Group, Inc., Assessing the Impact ofIntegrator
Practices on Contract Poultry Growers, Sept. 2001, 3-3 to 3-18 (description and analysis
of terms in two sample contracts).
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agreed price system.25 Both production and marketing contracts
commonly contain language purporting to shield the integrator from
liability for the grower's actions. 26 Contracts are sometimes form
contracts in which the only negotiable term is price.
Contracting has been the dominant model in the poultry industry
for many years, with almost 90 percent of broilers sold under contract.27 It
is becoming increasingly common in the pork industry as well. In 2004, 69
percent of hogs were sold under marketing contracts, up from 2 percent in
1980.28 The practice is much less common in the cattle industry. In 2005,
packers acquired only about 29 percent of cattle under contracts, a figure
down from a high of 35 percent in 2002.29
There are many reasons for using production and marketing
25 See TOM HARKIN, ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN THE
FOOD AND AGRICULTURE SECTOR: TRENDS, CONSEQUENCES AND POLICY OPTIONS 12(2004). Production contracts are more common in the poultry sector, while marketing
contracts are more common for cattle and hogs. Id.26For example, a clause in a standard swine marketing contract Farmland uses in Iowa
provides that:
"it is understood and agreed by the parties that this Agreement does not create a
fiduciary relationship between them, that the producer is an independent
contractor, and that nothing in this Agreement is intended to constitute either
party an agent, legal representative, subsidiary, joint venturer, partner,
employee, employer, joint employer, enterprise or servant of the other for any
purpose whatsoever... nor shall Farmland be deemed liable by reason of any act
or omission of producer in the conduct of its business pursuant to this
Agreement, or for any claim or judgment arising there from.
Iowa Office of the Attorney General, Working for Farmers, Contracts,
http://www.state.ia.us/govermnent/ag/images/contracts/Farmlandl.pdf (last visited Feb.
20, 2008)."
27 jAMES MACDONALD ET AL., CONTRACTS, MARKETS, AND PRICES: ORGANIZING THE
PRODUCTION AND USE OF AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES, AER-837,AER-83, at 15 (Nov.
2004) (88 percent of poultry produced under production contracts, 7 percent under
marketing contracts).
28 STEVE MARTINEZ & KELLY ZERING, PORK QUALITY AND THE ROLE OF MARKET
ORGANIZATION, AER-835 at 1 (Nov. 2004). In addition to the 69 percent of hogs raised
under marketing agreements, some of the 17 percent of hogs owned by packers were
raised under production contracts. Id
29 U.S. DEPr. AGRIC., GRAIN INSPECTION, PACKERS AND STOCKYARDS ADMIN., 2006
ANNUAL REPORT 54, available at http://archive.gipsa.usda.gov/pubs/06ar.pdf.
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contracts. From a grower's perspective, a contract provides some
protection against highly variable prices, offers a guaranteed market, and
reduces the transaction cost of finding a buyer. ' Contracts ease access to
capital; 32 in the poultry industry, in fact, a grower cannot even obtain
financing to construct a facility without first having a contract with an
integrator.33 Integrators prefer contracts because they provide a way to
control both the quality and quantity of the meat they receive. The
contracts give control over quality by specifying how the animals must be
raised.34 Ensuring a stable supply of meat is desirable because it can lower
processing costs. 5 Contracting enables integrators to obtain more animals
without needing more capital or labor.36 It may be a way to prevent rival
integrators from gaining access to the local market by tying up the supply
of animals.37 Finally-and most importantly for this article-integrators
prefer contracting to raising animals themselves because, for reasons
discussed below, it can somewhat insulate them from environmental
liability. In one survey, integrators marketing over 50,000 hogs per year
listed "reduced environmental and regulatory problems" as the second-
leading reason for using production contracts, behind only "increased
financial leverage." 38 Although integrators' desire to avoid liability for
30 See U.S. DEPT. AGRIC., ECON. RES. SERV, FARMERS' USE OF MARKETING AND
PRODUCTION CONTRACTS, USDA-AER No. 747 (1996).
31 See MACDONALD, supra note 26, at 25-29.
32 See FARMERS' USE OF MARKETING AND PRODUCTION CONTRACTS, supra note 29, at 3.
3 See Dan L. Cunningham, Guide for Prospective Contract Broiler Producers, Sept.
2005," See available at http://pubs.caes.uga.edulcaespubs/pubcd/Bl 167.htm.
34 See Wayne D. Purcell, Contracts and Captive Supplies in Livestock: Why We are
Here, Implications, and Policy Issues, (2001) at 9; available at
http://archive.gipsa.usda.gov/psp/issues/forum/Purcell.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2008).
31 See id.
36 See MACDONALD, supra note 26, at 25.
3 See Peter Carstensen, Concentration and the Destruction of Competition in
Agricultural Markets: The Case for Change in Public Policy, 2000 Wisc. L. REv. 531,
534 (2000).
3 8 JOHN LAWRENCE ET AL., PRODUCTION AND MARKETING CHARACTERISTICS OF U.S.
PORK PRODUCERS, 1997-1998, at table 12, available at
http://www.econ.iastate.edulfaculty/lawrence/Testimony/staffppr331.pdf (last visited
Sept. 26, 2007). "Increased financial leverage" was listed on 39 of the 106 survey
responses and "reduced" environmental and regulatory problems" on 24; "accessing"
motivated labor" was the next leading advantage with 18; "cost" control" was listed on
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manure handling is not the only reason for the prevalence of contracting
over pure vertical integration-after all, contracting was the dominant
model in the poultry industry long before liability for manure disposal
became a realistic fear-it is surely the reason that contracts often specify
that growers are solely responsible for manure handling. However,
contracting has some disadvantages for integrators, as compared to
growing their own animals. In the survey described above, the top two
self-reported disadvantages of production contracts were "loss of control"
and "increased production costs."39
II. The Environmental Critique of CAFOs and the Legal System's
Response
A. Environmental Problems
CAFOs cause serious environmental problems. The most severe is
the contamination of water with manure. The vast amount of manure
produced by confined animals 40 contains pathogens harmful to humans41
and nutrients that reduce the oxygen available to marine life.42 According
to EPA's 2000 Water Quality Inventory Report, 43 "[a]griculture, including
only 7 responses. Id Because these responses came from a voluntary survey, the
numbers are not scientifically reliable.
39 In the survey, the top five self-reported disadvantages of production contracts were
"loss" of control" with 21, "increased" production costs" with 13, "paying" for grower
assets" with 10, "differing" agendas" with 10, and "grower" mismanagement" with 5. Id
40 EPA has estimated that confined animals in the United States generate approximately
128 billion pounds of manure annually. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ALTERATIVE
TECHNOLOGIES/USES FOR MANURE (draft), EPA Pub. 833-D-02-001 (2002) at 1.
41 See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF ANIMAL FEEDING
OPERATIONS (1998) available at http://www.epa.gov/guide/feedlots/envimpct.pdf.
Agricultural runoff from land application of cow manure and wastewater from a
slaughterhouse and meat packing plant were among the suspected causes of a
cryptosporidium outbreak in Milwaukee in 1993, which sickened 400,000 people and
killed about 100. See id. at 20.
42 See id. at 7-16.
43 See National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit Regulation and Effluent
Limitation Guidelines and Standards for Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations
(CAFOs), 68 Fed. Reg. 7176, 7181 (Feb. 12, 2003) (hereinafter 2003 Final CAFO Rule).
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animal confinements, is the leading cause of water quality impairments in
the nation's rivers, streams, lakes, ponds and reservoirs. Agriculture is also
the fifth leading contributor to water quality impairments in the nation's
estuaries."" In the Upper Midwest between 1990 and 2000, pollution
from livestock caused more fish kills than municipal and industrial
pollution combined.45
Some of this water pollution comes from over-application of
manure. Large CAFOs often produce too much manure for the
surrounding farmland to absorb when the manure is applied to crops as
fertilizer.46 The amount of what the USDA calls "excess nutrients" has
been rising because while the amount of manure produced has been
increasing, the amount of crop and pasture land controlled by CAFOs has
been decreasing, from 3.6 acres per 1,000 pounds live animal weight in
1982 to 2.2 acres in 1997.47 Manure applied too heavily can run off into
waterways when it rains. The accumulation of manure from around the
4 Terence Centner holds a contrary view about the environmental impact of animal
feeding operations, that animal feeding operations impair "only" about 3.3 percent of
rivers and 0.5 percent of lake acreage. Terence J. Centner, Establishing a Rational Basis
for Regulating Animal Feeding Operations: A View of the Evidence, 27 VT. L. REV. 115,
121 (2002).
45 See RACHEL HOPPER, GOING TO MARKET: THE COST OF INDUSTRIALIZED
AGRICULTURE 13 (2002).
46 See Charles W. Abdalla, The Industrialization ofAgriculture: Implications for Public
Concern and Environmental Consequences ofIntensive Livestock Operations, 10 PENN.
ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 175, 187 (2002). Although manure can be used as a fertilizer, it has
low economic value because the nutrients in manure are dilute, making transportation,
storage, and application more expensive, and because different nutrients are intermixed,
sometimes in non-useful proportions. See Laura Martin & Kelly Zering, Relationships
Between Industrialized Agriculture and Environmental Consequences: The Case of
Vertical Coordination in Broilers and Hogs, 29 J. AGRIC. & APPLIED ECON. 45, 50
(1997). The use of manure as an energy source is being researched, but has not occurred
on a large scale. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ALTERATIVE TECHNOLOGiES/USES FOR
MANURE, supra note 39.
47 2003 Final CAFO Rule, 68 Fed. Reg at 7180. 60 percent of nitrogen and 70 percent of
phosphorus generated at larger CAFOs must be taken "off site." Id. See also CHARLES H.
LANDER ET AL., NUTRIENTS AVAILABLE FROM LIVESTOCK MANURE RELATIVE TO CROP
GROWTH REQUIREMENTS, USDA RESOURCE ASSESSMENT AND STRATEGIC PLANNING
WORKING PAPER 98-1 (1998); KELLOGG ET AL., MANURE NUTRIENTS RELATIVE TO THE
CAPACITY OF CROPLAND AND PASTURELAND TO ASSIMILATE NUTRIENTS: SPATIAL AND
TEMPORAL TRENDS FOR THE UNITED STATES (2000).
239
Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv., Vol. 15, No. 2
country harms estuaries, causing algae blooms that can kill and
49contaminate fish. Scientists also consider excess nutrients to be a cause
of the hypoxic "dead zones" that occur annually in more than half of the
coastal waters in the United States.50 According to the 2003 Report of the
Pew Oceans Commission, "[t]he greatest pollution threat to coastal marine
life today is the runoff of excess nitrogen from fertilized farm fields,
animal feedlots and urban areas." 5' Contamination of groundwater is also
a concern. One-third of drinking water wells in Maryland, which has many
large poultry CAFOs, exceed safe levels for nitrates, a component of
manure.52
Animal manure can also cause acute harms to waterways. Manure
spills, usually from manure storage lagoons or from pipes taking manure
to fields, can have catastrophic effects on streams. The best-known
example is the failure of an eight-acre manure-storage lagoon in North
Carolina in 1995, which spilled 25 million gallons of animal waste, killing
40 million fish over a 17-mile stretch of river (another million-gallon spill
occurred at a separate facility the same day53). These disasters continue to
48 See generally John H. Davidson, Factory Fields: Agricultural Practices, Polluted
Water and Hypoxic Oceans, 9 GREAT PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J. 1 (2004).
49 See Harmful Algal Bloom and Hypoxia Amendments Act of 2003, S. Comm. Print No.
108-125 (2003) at 2 ("Those blooms can kill fish and other marine organisms, poison
people who eat contaminated seafood, and cause respiratory distress in susceptible people
due to inhalation of aerosolized toxin.") The Harmful Algal Bloom and Hypoxia
Research and Control Act of 1998 created an interagency task force to assess the
problem. Public Law 105-383 (Nov. 13, 1998) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1451). The act
was re-authorized by the Harmful Algal Bloom and Hypoxia Amendments Act of 2004,
Public Law 108-456.
50 See David Malakoff, Death by Suffocation in the Gulf of Mexico, 281 SCIENCE No.
5374, 190-92 (July 10, 1998). The largest dead zone, in the Gulf of Mexico, has averaged
about 4,800 square miles since 1985. Press Release Louisiana Universities Marine
Consortium (July 29, 2005), available at
http://www.lumcon.edu/Information/news/default.asp?XMLFilename=2005080IRabalais
Hypoxia.xml.
PEW OCEANS COMMISSION, AMERICA'S LIVING OCEANS: CHARTING A COURSE FOR A
SEA CHANGE 2 (2003).
52 Peter Goodman, An Unsavory Byproduct: Runoff and Pollution, WASHINGTON POST,
Aug. 1, 1999, at A6.
5 Joby Warrick, Hog-waste Spill Fouls Land, River in Onslow, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), Jun. 23, 1995, at Al; Wade Rawlins & Ben Stocking, Chicken Waste
240
ENFORCING ENVIRONMENTAL LA WIN AN UNEQUAL MARKET
occur. Marks Dairy Farm in New York spilled several million gallons of
liquid manure into the Black River in August 2005, killing over 375,000
fish. 54
Although this article focuses on water pollution from CAFOs,
recent years have also seen increasing concern over air pollution from
CAFOs. The decomposition of animal manure creates hydrogen sulfide
and ammonia gases and the ventilation of barns releases animal dander
and dried manure.55 Odor, of course, is a serious problem as well.
B. Environmental Regulation of CAFOs
Water pollution from CAFOs has been addressed primarily under
the Clean Water Act. Although the CWA regulates only point sources of
pollutants,56 and water pollution from CAFOs often comes from wide
areas such as from feedlots and fields, the Clean Water Act explicitly
defines CAFOs as point sources. Under the applicable regulations, a
CAFO is defined as a large "Animal Feeding Operation" (AFO), which is
in turn defined as an unvegetated facility where animals are kept more
than 45 days in any 12 month period. To qualify as a "large CAFO" an
AFO must contain more than a specified number of animals. To be
defined as a "medium CAFO" an AFO must contain a somewhat smaller
Hits River, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Jul. 5, 1995, at Al; Michael Satchell,
Hog Heaven--and Hell, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Jan. 22, 1996, at 57.
54 Press Release, New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (August 3,
2006), available at http://www.dec.state.ny.us/website/press/pressrel/2006/2006120.html.
The dairy agreed to settle the violations for $2.2 million. Id.
55 IOWA STATE UNIVERSITY AND THE UNIVERSITY OF IOWA STUDY GROUP, IOWA
CONCENTRATED ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATIONS AIR QUALITY STUDY, FINAL REPORT 35-
39 (2002), available at http://www.ehsrc.uiowa.edulcafo air qualitystudy.html.
56 The CWA defines the "discharge of any pollutant" as "(A) any addition of any
pollutant to navigable waters from any point source, [or] (B) any addition of any
pollutant to the waters of the contiguous zone or the ocean from any point source other
than a vessel or other floating craft." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (2006).
s" 33 U.S.C. § 1362 (14) ("The term 'point source' means any discernible, confined and
discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any... concentrated animal feeding
operation.").40 C.F.R. § 122.23(b) (2006).
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number of animals. 59 An AFO can also be designated as a CAFO if EPA
or an authorized state regulator determines that the AFO "is a significant
contributor of pollutants to waters of the United States." 60
EPA promulgated its first CAFO regulations in 1974 and 1976.61
In response to settlements entered into with the Natural Resources Defense
Council in 1992 and 1999,62 EPA promulgated new regulations under the
Clean Water Act in 2003. The new regulations had three primary
components: They established effluent limitation guidelines, they
required that all CAFOs obtain permits, 64 and they required the permits to
include nutrient management plans to implement the effluent guidelines. 65
The new requirements imposed significant costs on the CAFO industry;
the USDA estimated that the new nutrient management requirements
would cost the poultry and livestock sectors about $1 billion, increasing
5 To give an idea of the scale of these operations, the thresholds for a large CAFO are,
for example, 700 mature dairy cows, 2500 swine weighing more than 55 pounds each, or
55,000 turkeys. 40 C.F.R. § 122.23(b)(4).
60 40 C.F.R. § 122.23(c) (2006).61 See Effluent Limitations Guidelines, 39 Fed. Reg. 5,704 (Feb. 14, 1974); Concentrated
Animal Feeding Operations, 41 Fed. Reg. 11,458 (Mar. 18, 1976).62 See Management Options for Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Water Resources. And Environment of the House Comm. on
Transportation. And Infrastructure, 107th Cong. (May 16, 2001).
63 2003 Final CAFO Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. at 7183, 7207-26. The guidelines established not
numerical limitations on discharges, but rather best management practices. Id. They
required that CAFOs land apply manure at unspecified rates that would "minimize
phosphorus and nitrogen transport from the field to surface waters in compliance with
technical standards for nutrient management established by the Director [of the state
regulatory program]." Id. They also prohibited existing CAFOs from discharging except
in the event of a 25-year, 24-hour storm, and new CAFOs from discharging except in the
event of a 100-year, 24-hour storm. Id.
S-Id. at 7182. Large CAFOs were given the opportunity to demonstrate that they never
discharged in lieu of obtaining a permit. Id. EPA estimated that these regulations would
increase the number of CAFOs that needed a permit to an estimated 15,500. Id. at 7176.
65 Id. at 7182. The plans were to "identify practices necessary to implement the [effluent
limitation guidelines] and any other requirements in the permit and ... include
requirements to land apply manure, litter, and process wastewater consistent with site
specific nutrient management practices that ensure appropriate agricultural utilization of
the nutrients." Id.
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production costs on the order of one percent. Despite these costs, EPA
predicted that the rule would put few large CAFOs out of business.67
The new regulations were immediately challenged in court by both
industry and environmentalists. In Waterkeeper Alliance v. EPA,68
("Waterkeeper") the Second Circuit struck down several aspects of them.
The court ruled that the terms of nutrient management plans must be
incorporated into permits, that the public was entitled to participate in the
development and enforcement of the plans, and that permitting authorities
were entitled to review the plans. 6 9 The incorporation of nutrient
management plans into permits is significant because once a plan is made
part of a permit, a violation of that plan constitutes a violation of the
permit, and by extension, the Clean Water Act. The court further held that
EPA could not require all CAFOs to apply for a permit, on the ground that
since the Clean Water Act regulates only actual discharges, not potential
discharges, a CAFO could not be subject to the Act until it had
discharged. 70 EPA has proposed new regulations in response to that
66 The exact estimates varied by region and depended on the perhaps optimistic
assumption that 40 percent of farmland in the United States would be willing to accept
manure. See MARC RIBAUDO ET AL., MANURE MANAGEMENT FOR WATER QUALITY,
CosTs To ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATIONS OF APPLYING MANURE NUTRIENTS TO LAND,
AER-824, 82-84 (2003). If less farmland were available, the costs would be higher.
6' 2003 Final CAFO Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. at 7245-46. EPA's economic analysis indicated
that no CAFOs in the veal, dairy, turkey, and egg laying sectors would be at risk of
closure, and that about 3 percent of the large CAFOs in the beef cattle, heifer, hog and
broiler sectors would be at risk. Id.
6 399 F.3d 486 (2005).69 Id. at 502-04. The court reasoned that nutrient management plans had to be
incorporated into the permits because they constituted "applicable effluent limitations,"
which, under 33 U.S.C. sections 1311(a), 1311(b), & 1342(a), must be included in
permits. Id. at 502-03. The public participation ruling was based on the Clean Water
Act's public participation provision (33 U.S.C. section 125 1(e)).1251(e). Id. at 502.
7o Id. at 504-06. The decision also upheld several aspects of the regulations, including a
provision regarding the so-called "agricultural stormwater exception." Id. Whether
runoff from fields where manure has been applied should qualify as point source
discharges has been a disputed issue, because while the Clean Water Act provides that
CAFOs are point sources, it excludes from the definition of "point source" any
"agricultural storm water discharges and return flows from irrigated agriculture." Id. The
2003 CAFO regulations resolved this issue by providing that precipitation-related
discharges of manure from fields would be agricultural storm water discharges (and thus
exempt from regulation) if the manure was "applied in accordance with site specific
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decision." In accordance with the Waterkeeper decision, the proposed
regulations will require a CAFO to seek a permit only if it actually
discharges or proposes to discharge manure; will require permitting
authorities to review nutrient management plans and provide for public
comment; and will require that nutrient management plans be incorporated
72into permits.
Although CAFO regulations under the Clean Water Act have been
on the books since the 1970s, EPA paid little attention to CAFOs until the
1990s. 73 As CAFOs grew larger and more numerous, and after some high
profile disasters such as the 1995 North Carolina spills, EPA and state
regulators began to pay more attention to enforcement. In 1998, EPA and
USDA published a "Unified National Strategy for Animal Feeding
Operations" that set performance standards and goals for animal feeding
operations. CAFO compliance is now on EPA's official list of
enforcement priorities.75
Regulators have paid much less attention to air pollution from
CAFOs. EPA has only recently begun to include Clean Air Act claims in
its enforcement actions. EPA also now asserts76 that air emissions from
nutrient management practices that ensure appropriate agricultural utilization." 40 C.F.R.§ 12 2.23(e). The Second Circuit held that the regulation was a permissible construction
of the Act. Waterkeeper Alliance, 399 F.3d at 506-09.
71 See Revised National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit Regulation and
Effluent Limitation Guidelines for Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations in Response
to Waterkeeper Decision, 71 Fed. Reg. 37744-37787 (June 30, 2006) (to be codified at
C.F.R. pt. 122, 412). See also http://www.epa.gov/guide/cafo/ (last visited Sept. 26,
2007) (useful collection of documents related to the 2003 rule and the proposed
revision).revision.
72 See 71 Fed. Reg. at 37745.37744.
7 3 See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, LIVESTOCK AGRICULTURE: INCREASED EPA
OVERSIGHT WILL IMPROVE ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAM FOR CONCENTRATED ANIMAL
FEEDING OPERATIONS, GAO-03-285, 9-10 (2003).
74 Unified National Strategy for Animal Feeding Operations, 63 Fed. Reg. 50192-209
(Sept. 21, 1998).
7 EPA,AGENCY, NATIONAL PRIORITIES FOR ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE
ASSURANCE, FY 2005-07, available at
http://www.epa.gov/oecaerth/resources/policies/data/planning/npmguidance 1 008.pdf.http
://www.epa.gov/oecaerth/data/planning/priorities/index.html#priorities
76 See EPAAGENCY, RESPONSE TO PUBLIC COMMENTS ON THE ANIMAL FEEDING
OPERATION AIR AGREEMENT, available at
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CAFOs may also be subject to the reporting requirements of the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
(CERCLA) 77 and the Emergency Planning and Community Right To
Know Act (EPCRA). Because EPA's claims have been hampered by the
difficulty in measuring emissions from CAFOs and a lack of knowledge
about how to accurately estimate them, in 2005 the agency offered
integrators and contract growers a generic settlement of Clean Air Act
violations, exchanging conditional covenants not to sue for the payment of
fairly small penalties. 79
III. The Economic Critique of CAFOs and the Legal System's
Response
A separate group of commentators, comprising agricultural
economists and advocates for small farms, has criticized the market
dynamics in the CAFO industry. They contend that integrators have
accumulated market power over growers. One such critic, for example,
testified before Congress that there "are serious problems of market
failure" in segments of the meat industry, including "price manipulation
by buyers, discrimination among producers, and conduct strategically
aimed at exploiting and entrenching market power."80
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/agreements/caa/cafo-agr-response-com.html
(last visited September 20, 2007).
7 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) (2006).
78 42 U.S.C. § 9603 (2006) (requires reports of hazardous substances from facilities of
releases that exceed a "reportable quantity"); 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) (2006) (, defines a
facility in a manner that clearly encompasses animal feeding operations);operations,42
U.S.C. § 11004 (2006) (, requires that reports under CERCLA also be provided to state
and local emergency planners). See also planners. In Sierra Club v. Tyson Foods, 299 F.
Supp. 2d. 693 (2003) (supporting this reading of CERCLA and EPCRA).,The court held
that Tyson Foods was both "the person in charge" and the "operator" on the facilities
owned by the independent growers with whom it contracted. Id. at 711.
79 See Animal Feeding Operations Consent Agreement and Final Order; Notice, 70 Fed.
Reg. 4958-77 (Jan.(January 31, 2005). More than 2,700 animal feeding operations signed
on to the consent agreement. See EPA, Animal Feeding Operatings Air Agreements,
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/agreements/caa/cafo-agr-060 4 .html (last
visited Feb. 7, 2008).2007). The 2700 AFOs comprise more than 6,700 farms. Id.
80 Monopsony Issues in Agriculture: Buying Power of Processors in Our Nation's
Agricultural Markets, Hearing before the Sen. Judiciary Comm. (Oct. 30, 2003)
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A. Integrators' Market Power
As discussed above, the meat processing sector, the primary
business of integrators, has become concentrated. Typically, firms begin to
accumulate market power (the ability to unilaterally set prices) when the
market share held by the largest four firms exceeds the 40 to 45 percent
range that is common in American industry.81 As noted, in 2005, the top
four beef processing companies controlled 83.5 percent of the market."
For several reasons, the market power of integrators is likely even stronger
than these numbers suggest. First, the perishability of agricultural products
exacerbates the effect of concentration. Most animals cannot be
transported a long distance from where they are raised to where they will
be slaughtered. Growers can therefore do business only with nearby
slaughterhouses. National statistics about market concentration therefore
do not tell the whole story, for regional concentration can be more
important.
Integrators may also have a stronger market position than the four-
firm concentration suggests because they have better access to information
than growers. Integrators are often more familiar with the meat-raising
business, particularly when dealing with a first-time grower. Integrators
also have better information about pricing. They enter into contracts
with many growers, whereas each grower typically enters into a contract
with only one integrator. Finally, integrators, whose financial resources
enable them better access to legal advice, may be better able to assess the
financial risks of environmental liability.
Integrators' bargaining power is also magnified because the nature
of CAFO production techniques creates a hold-up problem for growers.
The barns, manure disposal equipment, and other facilities used for
growing animals in CAFOs are expensive and typically require a grower
to take out long-term loans to acquire the necessary capital. A grower is
(testimony of Peter Carstensen) (hereinafter Monopsony Hearing), available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfinid-975&wit id=2782.
81 HARKIN, ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN THE FOOD AND
AGRICULTURE SECTOR, supra note 25, at 8.
82 MARY HENDRICKSON AND WILLIAM HEFFERNAN, CONCENTRATION OF AGRICULTURAL
MARKETS (2005).
MACDONALD, supra note 27, at 52.
246
ENFORCING ENVIRONMENTAL LAWIN AN UNEQUAL MARKET
free to negotiate financial terms with an integrator when it first enters the
business. But once the initial contract has expired, a grower has little
choice but to enter into another contract in order to the able to continue to
pay off his or her loans, for the CAFO facilities and equipment are good
for no other purpose.84 Often there are few, if any, other buyers with
whom to contract; in the hog and cattle industries for example, there is
often only one buyer, and rarely more than three, in any given area. So
when the contract renewal is being negotiated, the processor holds all the
cards and so can dictate the terms of the new contract.
Economists have disagreed about whether there is direct economic
evidence of anti-competitive behavior in the meat industry.86 Some
indirect economic evidence suggests that integrators have used their
superior market position to gain an advantage over growers. In 1998, hog
prices paid to growers dropped to levels not seen since the Great
Depression. Meanwhile, Iowa Beef Processors, the nation's largest
meatpacker at the time, was able to generate record fourth-quarter profits
that were four times higher than for the same quarter in 1997. Such wide
variations in profits can indicate that one party holds an advantage in
bargaining power.88 Another indication of integrators' market power is
that the farmer's share of the pork retail dollar fell from about fifty cents
in 1970, before the processing stage of the meat industry became
significantly concentrated, to about twelve cents in December 1998.89
8 DARYLL E. RAY, AGRICULTURAL POLICY ANALYSIS CENTER, ON COMPENSATING
PRODUCERS WHO CONTRACT PRODUCTION (2005), http://agpolicy.org/weekcol/233.html;;
C. Robert Taylor, Restoring Economic Health to Contract Poultry Production,
Agricultural & Resource Policy Forum (2002); MACDONALD, supra note 27, at 27.
85 CONNOR ET AL., THE BAN ON PACKER OWNERSHIP AND FEEDING OF LIVESTOCK at 4.86 See Ward, A Review of Causes for and Consequences of Economic Concentration in
the U.S. Meatpacking Industry, supra note 23.8 7 HARKIN, EcoNOMIC CONCENTRATION AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE, supra note 25, at 8.88 Id.
8 HARKIN, ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE, supra note 25, at 9.
Some economists, however, believe that the farmer's share of the retail dollar is not a
valid measure of the competitiveness of the meat-raising industry. See PURCELL,
CONTRACTS AND CAPTIVE SUPPLIES IN LIVESTOCK, supra note 34, at 1. Citing a large
study performed by GIPSA, Purcell argues that there is no evidence that the increased use
of contracts has lowered the price that producers receive for their meat; rather, the
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Third, in the livestock sector, the spread between farm prices and
wholesale prices has risen sharply since the mid-i 990s, not what would be
expected in a fully competitive market.90 Fourth, over recent years there
has been an increase in spread between what packers pay for meat and
what they sell the meat for, suggesting a general decrease in
competitiveness in the meatpacking industry. 91 Anecdotal evidence is
consistent with the economic data. State regulators have noted an
increasing number of grower complaints about unfair integrator
practices.92 In-depth investigative reports in the Washington Post and the
Baltimore Sun in 1999 vividly described the ways in which integrators
used their market power over chicken growers in Maryland's Delmarva
Peninsula, one of the main chicken-raising areas in the country. 93
B. Proposed Market Reforms
Agricultural reformers who contend that integrators' market power
in the CAFO industry is a problem have generally proposed two kinds of
solutions: reducing integrators' market power or lessening its negative
consequences. This article takes no position on whether these reforms
would improve the economic efficiency of the CAFO industry, or whether
difficulties faced by meat producers in the past 20 years have primarily been caused by
depressed prices at the retail level. Id. at 2-7.
90 NEIL E. HARL, AGRICULTURE IN THE 21ST CENTURY 24 (2003), available at
http://www.econ.iastate.edu/faculty/harl/AgInTwentyFirstCentury.pdf 
.
91 CONNOR ET AL., THE BAN ON PACKER OWNERSHIP AND FEEDING OF LIVESTOCK at 2-3,
available at
http://www.econ.iastate.eduloutreach/agriculture/reports/PackerOwnership.pdf
92 Statement of State Attorneys General on "Producer Protection Act" (September 13,
2000) (on file with author). The statement also asserts that "[t]he"The poultry industry,
which has been vertically integrated for decades through the extensive use of contracts, is
replete with allegations of unfair treatment of producers." Id.
9 See Dan Fesperman and Kate Shatzkin; The Plucking of the American Chicken Farmer,
THE BALTIMORE SUN, Feb. 28, 1999 at L.A; Dan Fesperman & Kate Shatzkin, Taking a
Stand, Lstand osing the Farm, The BALTIMORE Sun, Mar. 1, 1999 at l.A.; Dan
Fesperman & Kate Shatzkin, Unprotected and Alone, The BALITMORE Sun, Mar. 2, 1999
at l.A.; Peter S. Goodman, An Unsavory Byproduct: Runoff and Nutrient Pollution,
WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 1999 at Al; Peter S. Goodman, Permitting a Pattern ofPollution,
WASH. POST, Aug. 2, 1999 at Al; Peter S. Goodman, Who Pays for What Is Thrown
Away?, WASH. POST, August 3, 1999 at Al. A.
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they should be enacted to help protect the traditional American ideal of
independent agriculture and small family farms. While those are vital
questions, this article will focus, in Section IV, only on whether reducing
integrators' market power or preventing integrators from taking advantage
of it would improve the environmental performance of CAFOs.
1. Reducing Integrators' Market Power
One proposed response to this market imbalance is to more
vigorously enforce existing antitrust statutes. Professor Peter Carstensen
has argued that "prompt and significant changes in both antitrust
enforcement and the market constituting regulations administered by the
U.S. Department of Agriculture" are needed to restore "socially and
economically desirable market conditions." 94 It is true that the federal
government has not taken any significant antitrust actions in this area. The
Antitrust Division of the United States Department of Justice has not
found antitrust violations in any recent meatpacking mergers, although it
does claim to be keeping a close eye on the industry.9 5 A Department of
Justice investigation in 1993 and 1994 into the proposed merger of two of
the top five beef packers did lead to the abandonment of the merger. 96 As
the Department of Justice admits, however, its power to slow the changes
in the agriculture industry is limited. 97 In sum, it is unrealistic to expect
antitrust actions against existing packers,98 even if such action is
94 Carstensen, supra note 37, at 531.
9 Monopsony Hearing, supra note 80, (statement of Hewitt Pate, Asst. Atty. Gen. for
Antitrust, U.S. Dept. of Justice).
96 d
97 See id. ("[T]he("the responsibility entrusted to us as enforcers of the antitrust laws is
not to engineer the best competitive structure for the marketplace.... We do not have the
power to restructure any industry, any market, or any company, or to stop any practice,
except in a precise and focused fashion as necessary to prevent or remedy specific
violations of the antitrust laws that we can prove in court. We are law enforcers, not
regulators.").
98 PAARLBERG ET AL., STRUCTURAL CHANGE AND MARKET PERFORMANCE IN
AGRICULTURE: CRITICAL ISSUES AND CONCERNS ABOUT CONCENTRATION IN THE PORK
INDUSTRY, Staff Paper #99-14, Purdue University (Oct. 1999) at 11. In a joint statement
released in 2000, the attorneys general of sixteen states asserted that "it is clear that
enforcement of antitrust laws, as interpreted by the courts, may not be enough to promote
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warranted. 99
Another way to try to equalize the bargaining power of growers
and integrators is to encourage collective bargaining by growers. o Two
federal statutes are designed to protect the bargaining rights of growers.
The Capper-Volstead Act' 0' allows farmers to form cooperatives despite
the provisions of the Sherman Act.102 The Agricultural Fair Practices
Act 103 prohibits those who purchase agricultural products for processing to
discriminate against producers on the basis of their membership in an
association of producers.' 04 However, the so-called "disclaimer clause" in
the AFPA has limited the effectiveness of the law. The clause allows a
processor to refuse to deal with the member of an association of producers
if the processor is able to cite any reason for its refusal other than the
membership in the association.o Despite the limited effectiveness of
these laws, growers have become increasingly organized. In the past
decade, grower-oriented legal action groups, such as the Rural
Advancement Fund International in North Carolina and the Farmers'
effective competition in agriculture. The antitrust laws do not provide us with the tools to
deal with an important cause of concentration in agriculture -- contracting." STATEMENT
OF STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL, supra note 92.
99 PAARLBERG ET AL., supra note 98, at 5, 10. The use of antitrust action in the meat
producing industry is controversial. Because the four-firm index in the swine industry is
still at a moderate level, the existing monopsony power may not be high enough to
warrant antitrust action there. Id. Moreover, the Justice Department has traditionally
been concerned primarily with market concentration where it has the capability to affect
consumer prices. See HARL, supra note 90, at 22 (opining that in agriculture, the
Department of Justice should focus also on the impact on producers). That is not likely
the case here, because the United States market for pork is integrated into the global
market, and the demand elasticity for pork is high. PAARLBERG ET AL., supra note 98, at
4-5. Thus, concentration in the meat packing business has the ability to affect the prices
paid to growers for their pork, but less ability to affect the prices paid by consumers.oo HARKIN, ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE, supra note 25, at
18.
101 7 U.S.C. § 291 (2000).
102 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000).
103 7 U.S.C. §§ 2301-06 (2000).
'" 7 U.S.C. § 2303 (2000).
105 The clause provides: "Nothing in this chapter shall prevent handlers and producers
from selecting their customers and suppliers for any reason other than a producer's
membership in or contract with an association of producers, nor require a handler to deal
with an association of producers." 7 U.S.C. § 2304 (2000).
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Legal Action Group in Minnesota, have been created. 06
2. Preventing Unfair Behavior
Other proposed reforms aim to lessen the negative consequences of
integrators' market power by prohibiting them from taking unfair
advantage of it. Critics have proposed both strengthening the enforcement
of existing statutes and creating new statutes.1 07
Agriculture-specific statutes govern competition in the meat
production industry. These statutes are "designed to protect farmers and
consumers from the harmful effects of excess consolidation and
integration." The Packers and Stockyards Act' 09 ("P&S Act") requires
fair practices in the livestock, poultry, and meat-packing industry."' In
particular, Section 202 of the P&S Act makes it unlawful for a packer to
"[e]ngage in or use any unfair, unjustly discriminatory, or deceptive
practice or device." Federal courts, however, have limited the
effectiveness of the law by narrowly construing what constitutes an unfair
practice.'' They require that the processor intends to discriminate and that
the practice is likely to cause actual competitive harm.112 A processor can
prove a lack of intent simply by showing that it had some legitimate
business reason for its action, an easy burden to meet. Courts have held
106 NEIL D. HAMILTON, A FARMER'S LEGAL GUIDE TO PRODUCTION CONTRACTS 124
(1995).
107 Some of the proposals described in this article as aimed at prohibiting unfair practices
could also be construed as addressing the imbalance of market power. For example,
proposals to prohibit the confidentiality clauses that integrators currently insist upon
could be characterized both ways. Outlawing such clauses would end an arguably unfair
practice integrators can only require because of their superior market power; it would
also address the information asymmetry that is a source of integrators' superior market
?ower.
DOUG O'BRIEN, DEVELOPMENTS IN HORIZONTAL CONSOLIDATION AND VERTICAL
INTEGRATION 7 (2005), available at
http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/articles/obrien-antitrust.pdf.
109 7 U.S.C. §§ 181-229(b) (2006). 181-229b.
110 The 2002 farm finally extended the protections of the act, such as they are, to hog
roducers. P.L. 107-171 § 10502 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 181).
" HARKIN, supra note 25, at 19-20.
112 Armour & Co. v. United States, 402 F.2d 712, 717 (7th Cir. 1968).
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that the P&S Act cannot limit the parties' freedom to contract.113 Finally,
the P&S Act has been ineffectively enforced by the Department of
Agriculture.114 In the past few years, some growers have attempted to use
citizen suits under the P&S Act to challenge the use of production
contracts. They have been unsuccessful." 5
Several bills related to agricultural contracting have been
introduced in the United States Congress in recent years, but none have
passed. An attempt to ban ownership of livestock by meatpackers for more
than fourteen days prior to slaughter failed to make it to the House floor in
113 See Jackson v. Swift Eckrich, Inc., 53 F.3d 1452, 1458 (8th Cir. 1995).114 Partly this is a result of poor staffing; the Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards
Administration (GIPSA), which enforces the P&S Act, has only a handful of lawyers.
HARKIN, supra note 25 at 20.
GIPSA completes only a handful of investigations a year-just eight in 2003, for
example. Id.
Several government reports in the past decade have criticized GIPSA enforcement. In
1997, the USDA's Office of Inspector General concluded that GIPSA lacked the ability to
effectively conduct investigations into anticompetitive activities, and in fact was not even
organized for operated for that purpose. In 2000, the General Accounting Office reached
a similar conclusion, criticizing GIPSA's ability to investigate anticompetitive activities
in the cattle and hog industries. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PACKERS AND
STOCKYARDS PROGRAMS: ACTIONS NEEDED TO IMPROVE INVESTIGATIONS OF
COMPETITIVE PRACTICES, GAO/RCED-00-242 (Sept. 2000), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/rcOO242.pdf.2000). More recent reports have reiterated
these complaints. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR
GENERAL, GRAIN INSPECTION, PACKERS AND STOCKYARDS ADMINISTRATION'S
MANAGEMENT AND OVERSIGHT OF THE PACKERS AND STOCKYARDS PROGRAMS, Report
No. 30601-01-Hy (Jan. 10, 2006), available at http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/30601-
01-HY.pdf;2006); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PACKERS AND STOCKYARDS
PROGRAMS: CONTINUING PROBLEMS WITH GIPSA INVESTIGATIONS OF COMPETITIVE
PRACTICES, GAO-06-532T, (March 9, 2006), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06532t.pdf 2006).
us See Pickett v. Tyson FreshMeats, 420 F.3d 1272, 1281-82 (11th Cir. 2005) (use of
marketing contracts by processor does not violate Section 202 of P&S Act because Tyson
had legitimate competitive purposes for using agreements). The 11th circuit relied in part
on London v. Fieldale Farms Corp., which held that a plaintiff bringing a case under
Section 202 must show not only that the defendant engaged in an unfair practice, but also
that the practice "adversely affects competition or is likely to adversely affect
competition." 410 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2005). This holding will make it much more
difficult for plaintiffs in that circuit to prevail in claims under the Packers and Stockyards
Act. See also Griffin v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 183 F. Supp. 2d 824, 828 (E.D. Va. 2002).
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2002.116 The 2002 Farm Bill came close to providing protections for
producers who use production contracts. It would have ensured that the
decision to arbitrate is truly voluntary. That provision was removed in
conference. The Fair Contracts for Growers Act, introduced several times
between 2002 and 2005, would have given farmers a choice of venues to
resolve disputes associated with production contracts. The Mandatory
Price Reporting Act of 1999 would have required price reporting and
public dissemination. The proposed Captive Supply Reform Act would
require packers (and producers) to bid against each other to win a contract
in open, public markets. In essence, it would prohibit secret deals. It also
would require a fixed base price in formula contracts.
There have been legislative efforts at the state level as well." 7 A
few have been successful. The Minnesota Agricultural Commodities
Contracts Act of 1990 protects farmers from the cancellation of a
production contract until they have recaptured their investment in
production facilities." 8 Iowa law prohibits confidentiality clauses in
production contracts.11 9 Kansas law contains a variety of provisions to
protect poultry producers, including requiring that poultry production
contracts be readable and contain a disclosure of risks, prohibiting unfair
or deceptive trade practices, and allowing producers to compare contract
terms.120 Arkansas, Georgia, and Illinois have statutes121 based in part on
the Producer Protection Act, a model statute proposed by the attorneys
general of 16 states, which creates an implied obligation of good faith,
116 Monopsony Hearing, supra note 80, (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy), available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/member_statement.cfm?id=975&witid=2629.Leahy).
117 (1 16)See O'BRIEN, supra note 108, at 6-7.
118 See MINN. STAT. § 17.92(1) (2007).17.92. The provision applies to production
contracts that require a producer to invest $100,000 or more in buildings and equipment.
Id. If the contractor (typically an integrator or processing company) cancels before the
producer has recouped that investment, the producer must be "reimbursed for damages
incurred by an investment in buildings or equipment that was made for the purpose of
meeting minimum requirements of the contract." Id. It also requires "a clear written
disclosure setting forth the nature of the material risks faced by the producer if the
roducer enters into the contract." MINN. STAT. § 17.91(2) (2007).
9 See IOWA CODE §§ 202.3, 202A.4 (2007).
120 See KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-1701(b)(1)-(2), (5) (2006). 16-1701.
121 See ARK. CODE. ANN. § 2-32-201 (2007);2-23-201; GA. CODE ANN. §§ 2-22-1 to 2-
22-5 (2007); 505 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 17/1-17/99 (2007).
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requires that risks be disclosed and that contracts be readable, limits
confidentiality, and restricts integrators' ability to terminate contracts.122
Alabama, Florida, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, and Iowa
have considered but have not passed similar legislation.123 These changes
have faced stiff political resistance across the country from the integrators'
powerful political lobby.124
IV. The Relationship Between Market Power and Environmental
Compliance at CAFOs
Environmental regulators have been slow to recognize how the
economic characteristics of the CAFO industry-vertical integration,
horizontal concentration, the use of contracting, and integrators' market
power-affect how the industry should be regulated. For example, the
"Unified National Strategy for Animal Feeding Operations"l2 published
jointly by EPA and USDA in 1999 almost entirely ignored the very
existence of integrators. The only mention is a single paragraph that states
that the role of integrators is to ensure that their "contract growers are
environmentally responsible," to consider the possible environmental
impacts of CAFOs when they locate their processing plants, and to "help
122 See also Steven Wu, Regulating Agricultural Contracts: What are the Tradeoffs?
CHOICES 18-2218(1) (2003) (analysis of Producer Protection Act), available at
http://www.choicesmagazine.org/2003-1/2003-1-05.pdf.. Boehije et al., The Producer
Protection Act-Will It Protect Producers?, 18 PURDUE AGRIC. ECON. REPORT 1-4(Feb.
2001) (criticism of the Producer Protection Act), available at
http://www.agecon.purdue.edulextension/pubs/paer/2001/paer201 
.pdf.. Senator Tom
Harkin of Iowa introduced a similar bill, called the Agricultural Producer Protection Act
(S-2343), in the 106th Congress in 2000, but it never reached a floor vote. Wu at 19-20.
It was reintroduced as the Securing the Future for Independent Agriculture Act of 2001
(S-20), and died in committee. Wu at 19-20.
123 See 92nd Ill. General Assembly, Status of HB0524, available at
http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/legisnet92/status/920HBo524.html (last visited Sept. 26,
2007) (Ill.(Iowa bill); HAMILTON, supra note 24, at 160-61 (other bills).124Kate Shatzkin & Dan Fesperman, Winning Battles but Losing the Political Wpolitical
ar, BALTIMORE SUN, March 2, 1999, at 7A.
125 U.S. DEP'T . OF AGRIC. & U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, UNITED NATIONAL STRATEGY
FOR ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATIONS (1999), available at
http://www.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/fmafost.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2007).
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develop alternatives for manure use and transport."' 26
While the 1999 Unified National Strategy largely ignored the
relationship between integrators and contract growers, a new debate about
CAFOs soon flared up that focused the attention on the market imbalance
in the meat production industry: the debate over integrator liability.' 27
Historically, EPA did not include integrators in its Clean Water Act
enforcement actions against CAFOs (except when the integrators were
operating CAFOs they owned themselves). But in 1999 EPA dropped a
bombshell, stating in a draft guidance document that parties who exercised
"substantial operation control" over a CAFO would be considered
"operators" under the Clean Water Act regulations and required to obtain
a Clean Water Act permit.128 "Substantial operational control" was to be
determined by evaluating factors including whether the party: (a) directed
the activity of persons working at the CAFO either through a contract or
direct supervision; (b) owned the animals; or (c) specified how the animals
were grown, fed, or medicated.129 This policy was clearly aimed at
integrators. Many integrators would have fallen under the ambit of this
definition of "operator," for as discussed above, integrators who use
production contracts own the animals raised at CAFOs and often specify
126 Id. at 33.6.0.
12 See also'2 7 Susan M. Brehm, Comment,Note, From Red Barn to Facility: Changing
Environmental Liability to Fit the Changing Structure ofLivestock Production, 93 CAL.
L. REv. 797, 814-34 (2005) (analysis of integrator liability). . See also Aya Ogishi e al.,
Animal Waste Policy: Reforms to Improve Environmental Quality, CHOICES: THE
MAGAZINE OF FOOD, FARM AND RESOURCE ISSUES, Fall 2002; Cynthia M. Roelle,
Comment, Pork, Pollution, and Priorities: Integrator Liability in North Carolina, 35
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1055 (2000). (2000);
128 See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, GUIDANCE MANUAL AND EXAMPLE NPDES PERMIT
FOR CONCENTRATED ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATIONS, REVIEW DRAFT 2-10 (August 6,
1999), available at
http://www.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/dman afo.pdfhttp://www.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/dmanafo
.pdf. announced in Notice of Availability: Draft Guidance Manual and Example NPDES
Permit for Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations, 64 Fed. Reg. 46,390 (Aug.(August
25, 1999). EPA claimed that this fairly broad interpretation of the statutory term
"operator" was merely a clarification of the existing law. Id. That was true in theory, but
not in practice. While a few courts have held integrators liable under an agency theory,
liability is not much of a risk for integrators at this time. See Brehm, From Red Barn to
Facility, supra note 127, at 814-34.
"9 See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,MANUAL, supra note 128, at 2-10.
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how the animals must be grown, fed, and medicated.13 0 An integrator who
issued a permit would then be liable for Clean Water Act violations at the
CAFOs it controlled, even if the violations were committed by the grower.
Because both the integrator and the grower would need a permit, this
proposal was referred to as "co-permitting." When EPA subsequently
included a co-permitting provision in its 2001 proposed CAFO
regulations,131 co-permittinp quickly became one of the most controversial
issues in the CAFO debate.
Proponents of co-permitting contended that it would encourage
integrators to ensure that their growers complied with the Clean Water Act
by installing the necessary waste handling infrastructure and managing
their facilities appropriately. Co-permitting would also give integrators an
incentive to reduce the costs of proper manure management in several
ways: by creating centralized manure storage and treatment facilities,
which would create economies of scale; 33 by providing growers with feed
that contained reduced levels of nitrogen and phosphorus;' 34 and by
researching new manure management technologies.
Integrators argued that they would be unfairly liable for manure
handling practices over which they had no effective control.135 They also
argued that making them liable for environmental violations by their
contract growers would cause them to abandon the contract system and
raise the animals themselves, thus driving contract growers out of
130 When EPA included a co-permitting requirement in its 2001 proposed CAFO
regulation, it estimated that "94 meat packing plants that slaughter hogs and 270 poultry
processing facilities may be subject to the proposed co-permitting requirements." 2001
Proposed CAFO Rule, supra note 15, at 2986. EPA stated that it did not expect that
integrators that entered into marketing contracts would need permits because they
fenerally did not exercise substantial operational control. Id.
3 Id.
132 See CLAUDIA COPELAND, ANIMAL WASTE AND WATER QUALITY: EPA REGULATION
OF CONCENTRATED ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATIONS (CAFOS), CRS-21 (April 15, 2003),
available at http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs/permalink/meta-crs-9077:1. 2003).
1 See 2001 Proposed CAFO Rule, supra note 15, at 3026. 3027.
134 See BOESSEN ET AL., CHAPTER 7: CO-PERMITTING PROVISIONS IN THE PROPOSED
REVISIONS TO THE NPDES PERMIT REGULATION AND EFFLUENT GUIDELINES AND
STANDARDS FOR CAFOs, COMMENTS TO THE USEPA ON THE CONCENTRATED ANIMAL
FEEDING OPERATION PROPOSED RULE 7-1 (July 26, 2001).
135 COPELAND, supra note 132.
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business. 136 Perhaps surprisingly, many contract growers opposed co-
permitting. They feared that integrators would require growers to
indemnify them for any environmental liability; that integrators would
begin to take more of a day-to-day management role at farms, depriving
growers of what autonomy they still have; and that integrators would use
environmental violations as a pretext for contract termination.
In the end, and to the surprise of those on both sides of the
debate,138 EPA did not include a co-permitting requirement in its final
regulation in 2003.139 A similar story has played out in state legislatures
and environmental agencies, with several considering and rejecting co-
permitting.140 Maryland briefly took a different approach, directly
requiring integrators to assist with manure disposal, but the regulation was
quickly challenged in court and dropped by an incoming Republican
governor. 141
The failure of these state and federal efforts suggests that it may be
politically infeasible to add co-permitting requirements to federal or state
136 COMMENTS OF US POULTRY AND EGG ASSOCIATION ON PROPOSED CAFO RULE (July
16, 2001), available at
http://poultryegg.org/environment/docs/Comments_1p.pdf#search=%22comment%20pro
posed%20co-permitting%22 ("Co-permitting will drive integrators (compelled to
minimize potential liability exposure) to large investor-owned or company owned farms
over time, at the expense of the family farmer.").
1 2001 Proposed CAFO Rule, supra note 15, at 3025-26. 3025.
13 PHILIPPE BONTEMS ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION OF LIVESTOCK
PRODUCTION CONTRACTS 50 (Ashgate ed., Institut d'Economie Industrielle, Toulouse
2004).,
139 Final CAFO Rule, supra note 43. The EPA's final regulation contained no
explanation for its decision to reject its initial proposal to require permits from integrators
who exercised substantial operational control over CAFOs. Id.
140 See Brehm, supra note 127, at 830; see also Goodman, supra note 52 (discussing how
integrators used powerful political connections to kill a Virginia bill which would have
made integrators liable for pollution from their contract farms); see also Josh Marks,
Regulating Agricultural Pollution in Georgia: Recent Trends and the Debate Over
Integrator Liability, 18 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1031 (2002).
141 Anita Huslin, Maryland Governor Ehrlich Eases Liability For Big Chicken Firms,
Drops Policy on Manure Runoff in Bay, WASH. POST, June 14, 2003, available at
http://www.mindfully.org/Industry/2003/Maryland-Liability-Chickenl4junO3.htm. 2003.
Paul L. Sorisio, Poultry, Waste, and Pollution: The Lack ofEnforcement ofMaryland's
Water Quality Improvement Act, 62 MD. L. REV. 1054 (2003) (description of the history
of the Maryland regulatory effort). .
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statutes and regulations. That does not mean that it is impossible to hold
integrators liable for pollution from CAFOs. Some private plaintiffs have
brought common law claims seeking to hold integrators vicariously liable
under the common law doctrines of nuisance and trespass.142 South
Dakota has a statute providing that an owner of livestock who "negligently
entrusts" it to another is jointly and severally liable for any environmental
damage the livestock cause.143 As mentioned above, Clean Water Act
regulations apply to discharges not only by owners of facilities, but by
"operators" as well. EPA stated in its 2001 proposed CAFO rule that "the
existing definition of "operator" in [40 C.F.R. §] 122.2 generally already
encompasses operators who exercise substantial operational control," 44
meaning that integrator liability could potentially be imposed despite the
agency's decision not to include an explicit provision in the final
regulation. Despite the lack of co-permitting requirements, therefore,
integrator liability remains possible.
A. The Implications of Integrators' Market Power for the Assignment
of Environmental Liability in the CAFO Industry
But is integrator liability good environmental policy? How does
the relative bargaining power of integrators and CAFO operators affect the
answer? Does it matter whether the pollution is intentional or accidental?
This subsection explores these three questions. It concludes that the strong
bargaining position integrators hold is indeed relevant to the assignment of
liability for CAFO pollution. In general, the more market power held by
integrators, the more responsibility integrators should bear, both because it
is fair and because it is likely to improve regulatory compliance.
1. The Fairness of Integrator Liability
Integrators argue that it is unfair to make them responsible for
142 See, e.g., Overgaard v. Rock County Board of Commissioners, 2002 WL 31924522
(D. Minn. 2002); Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Stevens, 783 So. 2d 804 (Ala. 2000).
143 S:D. CODIFied Laws § 20-9-30 (2007) (no reported cases involving this
statute).statute.
'" 2001 Proposed CAFO Rule, supra note 15, at 3023.
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pollution that they do not create. That argument has some intuitive appeal.
It is, after all, the growers who raise (and sometimes own) the chickens,
hogs, and cattle that pollute the water and the air. But upon closer
examination, integrators do bear some equitable responsibility,
particularly for nutrient over-application. That pollution is not primarily
the result of mismanagement or carelessness on the part of growers. It is
the aggregation of large numbers of animals in small areas and the
application of their manure onto insufficient acreage that transforms
manure from useful fertilizer to a pollutant. If the pollution is endemic to
the industry, then all players in the industry bear some responsibility. This
equitable argument, however, is less applicable to spills, which can be the
result of mismanagement or carelessness on the part of growers.
Another reason it can be unfair to make growers solely responsible
for CAFO pollution is that integrators using production contracts (in
which they own the animals and pay growers for raising them) often
exercise substantial control over the way the operations are run, including
aspects of the business that impact the amount of pollution created, such
as the composition of the feed and (less commonly) the handling of the
manure. 145 The more control integrators exercise over an operation, the
more fair it is to hold them responsible for pollution from that operation.
This equitable argument is therefore less applicable to integrators who use
marketing contracts (in which they agree to buy animals using a
predetermined pricing formula), for marketing contracts give integrators
less control over the ways the animals are raised
Finally, fairness mandates that a party that benefits from pollution
should help pay for its prevention. Integrators profit from CAFO pollution.
145 Contracts commonly require specific particular management techniques, which
sometimes extend to aspects of management that influence pollution. For example, some
contracts require particular manure handling techniques. See DAVID MOELLER,
LIVESTOCK PRODUCTION CONTRACTS: RISKS FOR FAMILY FARMERS 3 (Mar. 22, 2003),
available at http://www.flaginc.org/topics/pubs/arts/artcfO05.pdf. A less obvious, but
perhaps even more important, environmental aspect of production contracts is the
requirement that growers use feed specified (and often provided) by the processor. Feed
varies considerably in the amount of nitrogen it contains, which impacts the amount of
nitrogen a CAFO adds to the environment when it disposes of manure. TOMISLAV
VUKINA, THE IMPACT OF 2003 FEDERAL CAFO REGULATIONS ON INTEGRATOR-GROWER
RELATIONS, IN ANIMAL AGRICULTURE AND THE ENVIRONMENT: NATIONAL CENTER FOR
MANURE AND ANIMAL WASTE MANAGEMENT WHITE PAPERS 155-160 (2006).
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To the extent that growers save money by failing to adopt technologies
that reduce pollution, integrators are able to take advantage of those
savings by paying growers less for animals. It is therefore unfair to hold
the growers solely responsible for the costs of the pollution, even if they
directly cause it. In these two respects-operational control and financial
benefit-the degree of market power held by integrators determines the
balance of the equities. The more market power integrators have, the more
they can dictate the operational and financial terms of the contacts. And
the more market power integrators have, the greater the share of the
wealth created by the industry they are able to take for themselves. The
equitable justification for integrator liability is thus strongest where
integrators hold substantial market power.
2. The Effect of Integrator Liability on Compliance
Co-permitting was partly intended to improve regulatory
compliance by giving integrators an incentive to ensure that their growers
did not violate their permits. 146 Whether integrator liability would increase
compliance is a complicated question. But just as with the question of
equity, it turns out that the degree of integrators' market power affects the
answer (at least with regard to accidental manure spills, though not for
nutrient leaching). Economic theory suggests that when two contracting
parties participate in a pollution-generating activity, and one party holds
significant market power, it is important to hold that stronger party jointly
responsible for accidental pollution by the weaker party with whom it
contracts. Doing so becomes more necessary as the degree of market
power increases.
a. Compliance and Intentional Pollution
The greater market power of integrators does not justify making
them liable for manure over-application at CAFOs. To see why this is so,
146 See 2001 Proposed CAFO Rule, supra note 15, at 3026 ("co-permitting could
motivate corporate entities to oversee environmental compliance of their contract
growers, in order to protect themselves from potential liability, thus providing an
additional layer of environmental oversight").
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imagine the extreme case of an integrator withfull monopsonyl 47 power
over its growers. That integrator's monopsony power enables it to
determine the price it pays for the animals and any other terms of the
contract, such as how the animals are raised.148 That integrator will bear
the entire cost of the manure disposal requirements,149 even if the law does
not make it liable for violation of those requirements. 50 That is because,
in the language of economics, the integrator has already appropriated all
the profits from the raising of animals. In colloquial terms, the integrator
has already financially squeezed its growers as far as they can be
squeezed. As new costs of avoiding nutrient leaching are imposed on
growers, the hypothetical integrator with a monopsony will have to
subsidize those new costs's by offering its growers better contract terms.
Otherwise the growers, already operating at the margin, would go
bankrupt, and no new growers would want to do business with the
integrator.152
147 A monopsony exists where a market has only one buyer. The more familiar term
"monopoly" refers to a market with only one seller. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed.
2004).
148 Although integrators only have the contractual power to mandate production methods
when they use production contracts, an integrator with monopsony power could
presumably force a grower to accept a production contract instead of a marketing
contract.
149 One such cost will be drafting nutrient management plans. For CAFOs that have been
over-applying nutrients, complying with those plans may require obtaining additional
land for waste application, reducing the nutrient content of feed, using pre-application
treatment methods that reduce nutrients, or other methods.
15o See Tomislav Vukina, The Relationship Between Contracting and Livestock Waste
Pollution, 25 REVIEW OF AGRIC. EcoNomics, 66-88 (2003).
151 If the integrators could not afford to subsidize the costs of the regulations, they would
either have to pass the new costs on to consumers, find a more efficient method of
producing meat, or leave the business entirely.
52 Growers went bankrupt even before new environmental restrictions were imposed.
Integrators have remained able to sign up new growers for several reasons. First,
confidentiality clauses in contracts imposed by integrators slow the dissemination of
financial information among grower. Integrators have been able to use their informational
advantage and their marketing resources to sign up new growers even when many
growers lose money. Second, production contracts commonly employ a "tournament"
payment scheme, in which growers are paid according to how well they perform (in
terms of turning feed into meat) in comparison with nearby growers. Even if the average
grower loses money, new growers might still be willing to enter the system if they
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Now consider the actual situation, in which integrators have some,
but not total, market power. Growers doing business with such an
integrator can use their limited leverage to retain some portion of profits
earned by raising the animals and selling their meat. The integrators and
its growers will share the cost of complying with the new regulatory
requirements, eventually settling on the same division of the remaining
profits that they had before. 153 Thus, whether integrators have complete
market power or just some market power, they will end up paying much of
the cost of the environmental regulations regardless of whether the
integrator is made liable. 154 Economic theory suggests that making
integrators liable for non-compliance with manure disposal requirements
will not make them any more vigilant about compliance than they already
are.
The analysis so far suggests that integrators' market power does
not provide a justification for integrator liability for nutrient over-
application. This is because regardless of whether integrator liability is
imposed, integrators with complete or partial market power will bear at
least some share of the environmental costs. They will therefore have an
incentive to ensure compliance.
b. Compliance and Accidental Pollution
But what about accidental pollution? At CAFOs, such pollution
ranges from small spills from broken pipes carrying liquid manure to
catastrophic spills from lagoons. As explained below, when integrators
hold market power, integrator liability should reduce the chance of
believed that they could outperform their competitors. Finally, some growers might want
to enter into contracts for non-financial reasons, such as a personal desire to raise
animals. But even if these advantages enable a monopsonistic integrator to shift some
costs to its already-marginal growers in the short term, in the long run it could not do so,
for too many of its growers would fail to earn a profit.
153 Vukina, supra note 150, at 136.
154 EPA recognized this problem when, in its discussion of its co-permitting proposal, it
stated: "As a practical matter, however, regulatory authorities have limited ability to
influence who pays for environmental compliance, since the division of costs and
operational responsibilities is determined by private contracts, not regulation." 2001
Proposed CAFO Rule, supra note 15, at 3024.
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accidental manure spills.
Regulating accidental pollution is different from regulating
intentional pollution. The EPA can directly regulate the conduct that
causes nutrient runoff. Addressing accidental pollution, by contrast, is a
matter of regulating risk. It is true that regulators can mandate behavior
that reduces the chance of an accident. CAFO permits can contain
conditions that reduce the risk of a manure spill, for example, by requiring
growers to regularly inspect manure storage lagoons and prohibiting them
from filling them too high. Where such direct regulations exist, the
analysis of incentives is the same as for intentional pollution. But
compliance with the literal regulatory requirements can only do so much
to prevent accidents. The ultimate risk of a manure spill depends on the
level of care exhibited by a grower, who understands the idiosyncrasies of
his or her particular operation, terrain, and climate. What effect would
integrator liability have on the level of care?
Economic research on a related issue-lender liability-offers
insight into whether imposing liability on integrators will cause growers to
be more careful. Lender liability theory examines a generic situation in
which a lender with deep pockets loans money to a firm with limited
assets that engages in a hazardous activity. The borrowing firm is liable
for its accidents; the question is whether making the lender jointly liable
will reduce the chance of an accident. On first glance, it seems likely that
it will. A lender with no liability for the borrower's accidents would seem
to have no incentive to encourage the borrower to prevent them. A lender
facing joint liability would seem to have an incentive to pressure the
borrower to be more careful, decreasing the risk of an accident. 155
The economist Rohan Pitchford, however, has argued that lender
liability can actually increase the risk of an accident.156 He reasons (based
on a formal economic model) that a lender facing possible liability for the
borrower's accidents will charge the borrower higher interest. From the
borrower's perspective, the higher loan payments would be like accident
155 Models developed by several economists supported that conclusion. See, e.g.,
Anthony Heyes, Lender Penalty for Environmental Damage and the Equilibrium Cost of
Capital, 63 ECONOMICA 311 (1996); and Marcel Boyer et al., Environmental Risks and
Bank Liability, 41 EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 1427 (1997).
156 See Rohan Pitchford, How Liable Should a Lender Be: The Case ofJudgment-Proof
Firms and Environmental Risk, 85 AMER. EcoN. REv. 1171 (1995).
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insurance. In exchange for paying higher rates, the borrower would know
it would not have to pay an accident victim as much because the victim
would likely seek compensation from the deep-pocket lender. Because the
financial consequences on the borrower of an accident would be reduced,
it would have less incentive to avoid accidents.
So does lender liability increase or decrease the chances of an
accident? The economist Dieter Balkenborg has argued that the answer
depends on the relative bargaining power of the lender and the
borrower.1 7 His economic modeling indicates that when a lender has
relatively high bargaining power, its pressure on the borrower will
increase the firm's level of care. The reason is that when a lender has more
leverage over the borrower, it has more incentive to insist the borrower be
careful because it can extract the financial benefit of accident avoidance.
A lender with less bargaining power than the borrower, by contrast, has
less incentive to insist on care because it benefits less from accident
avoidance and because it has less ability to force the borrower to act
carefully. Therefore, the higher a lender's bargaining power relative to a
borrower's, the more it makes sense to impose lender liability.
This research in the field of lender liability is applicable to the
CAFO industry. Integrators are similar to the hypothetical lenders in that
they have deeper pockets and a financial relationship with contract
growers on which the growers depend. Contract growers are analogous to
the hypothetical borrowers in that they are engaging in a hazardous
activity and have relatively few assets compared to the lender. The
question, then, is whether integrator liability will increase or decrease how
careful growers are to avoid spills. The answer depends on how much
market power integrators have. Assuming that penalties for accidents are
set high enough, extra steps to avoid manure spills-perhaps by building
better storage lagoons and inspecting them carefully-though initially
costly, will save growers money in the long run because they will avoid
penalties. 5 8 If integrators have significant market power, they have an
157 See Dieter Balkenborg, How Liable Should a Lender be? 91 AMER. EcON. REV. 731
(2001). Subsequent economic literature has accepted his conclusion. See, e.g., Rohan
Pitchford, How Liable Should a Lender Be? The Case ofJudgment-ProofFirms and
Environmental Risk: Reply, 91 AMER. ECON. REv. 739 (2001).
i58 To assess whether extra care will save money, growers and integrators must make
numerous estimates, such as how much spill prevention measures will cost, how much
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incentive to force the growers to take those steps because the integrators
will be able to appropriate those savings by offering the growers less
money for the animals.1 59 Their greater bargaining power, moreover,
enables integrators to force growers to take that extra care. If, by contrast,
integrators lack market power, they have less incentive to demand those
terms because they will be less able to extract the long-term savings, and
they will have less power to impose the terms in the first place. For those
reasons, economic research on lender liability suggests that the greater the
integrators' bargaining power, the more integrator liability is likely to
encourage integrators to prevent environmental accidents such as manure
spills.
Will integrator liability reduce a grower's incentive to be careful?
Here, there is a difference between lender liability theory and the analysis
of integrator liability. The form of integrator liability discussed in this
article is not liability to private parties harmed by an accident but rather
liability to the government for penalties. The borrowing firm considered
above may be able to safely assume that an injured party will pursue his or
her claim against the deep pocketed lender. A grower cannot assume that
the government will seek penalties only against an integrator (unless, as
discussed below, the grower is judgment-proof). Unlike private plaintiffs,
environmental regulators are concerned not with obtaining the largest
monetary judgment for the least effort, but with ensuring that all
responsible parties pay appropriate penalties. A grower who recognizes
that fact will not be careless when integrators are jointly liable. Unlike
lender liability, therefore, the imposition of integrator liability is not likely
to be counter-productive even when integrators hold less-than-total market
those measures will reduce the chance of a spill, how likely an environmental regulator is
to detect the spill, how likely it is that penalties will be imposed, and how large the
penalties will be. While these estimates are difficult to make, that difficulty does not
invalidate this article's economic analysis of integrator liability, for the same difficulties
exist with regard to the traditional penalty-based enforcement of all command-and-
control regulations.
159 Integrators facing the risk of liability are more likely to see these long-term savings
than growers would be. Any individual grower is unlikely to suffer a major spill, even if
he does not take extra care, simply because such spills are relatively rare. For an
integrator who contracts with dozens or hundreds of growers the risk of an accident
occurring at one of its contract farms is much greater.
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power.
c. Compliance by the Judgment-Proof
The analysis so far has not considered the problem of the
judgment-proof grower. As discussed above, when integrators have
substantial market power, contract growers may well be judgment-proof
because integrators can offer contract terms that leave growers operating
on the margin.160 The problem of the judgment-proof defendant was
extensively discussed by scholars in the 1990s'61 who realized that large
corporations engaged in hazardous activities had an incentive to outsource
them to judgment-proof subsidiaries or other companies.162 Scholars
feared that practice would enable the large corporations to avoid liability
entirely. Several industries provided examples. Creating subsidiaries was
widespread in the tobacco and hazardous waste disposal industries.16 3
Companies in the chemical industry also began to divest themselves of
160 In theory, just because a grower earns little or no net income does not necessarily
make it judgment-proof, for it might also have capital assets that the government could
attach, such as its barns. But in practice, contract CAFOs have few capital assets.
Contract growers typically take out large, long-term loans to purchase the facilities
needed to grow animals according to integrators' specifications, and changing technology
and integrator requirements can require growers to incur new debt for expensive
u grades. See Fesperman & Shatzkin, supra note 93.
The problem, of course, is older than that. Barney et al., Organizational Responses to
Legal Liability: Employee Exposure to Hazardous Materials, Vertical Integration, and
Small Firm Production, 35 ACADEMY OF MGT. J. 328, 330 (1992), provides an example
from the 1970s in which a large company contracted out the production of a dangerous
chemical to a small company with little assets. When it turned out that workers at the
small company had been harmed by exposure to those chemicals, the large company was
found not to be liable as a mere independent contractor. Id.
162 See Al H. Ringleb & Steven N. Wiggins, Liability and Large-Scale, Long-Term
Hazards, J. POLITICAL ECONOMY, 574, 589 (1990) ("the incentive to evade liability has
led to roughly a 20 percent increase in the number of small corporations in the US
economy"); Steven N. Wiggins & Al H. Ringleb, Adverse Selection andLong-Term
Hazards: The Choice between Contract and Mandatory Liability Rules, J. LEGAL
STUDIES, 189, 211 (1992) (empirical analysis providing consistent results). Seminal
articles on this topic in the legal literature include Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman,
Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability For Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879
(1991); and Lynn LoPucki, The Death ofLiability, 106 YALE L.J. 1 (1996).
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 162.
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particularly hazardous aspects of their business.' 64
A judgment-proof corporation presents a two-fold problem. First,
potential victims of hazardous accidents cannot obtain adequate
compensation for their injuries from judgment-proof firms. Second (and
more important for our purposes), regulators cannot always adequately
control the conduct of judgment-proof firms. The most important tool
regulators have for ensuring that companies comply with regulatory
requirements is the threat of civil penalties for violations. That threat may
work with a judgment-proof firm when the regulator is trying to force
simple, inexpensive modifications in the firm's behavior because the
threat to impose small fines is believable. The judgment-proof problem is
worse when a firm is engaging in an activity that can cause serious
accidents that are difficult to predict-like operating a manure storage
lagoon. In that case, the appropriate penalties would be large, and the
threat to impose them would be empty. Environmental agencies often have
policies limiting civil penalties (at least in settlements) to the maximum
amount the company can afford.' 65 A company with little to lose-such as
a marginally profitable CAFO-could simply cease operating rather than
pay the fine, a risk it might be especially willing to accept if accidents are
uncommon. Although regulators can still use injunctions, the threat of
criminal sanctions, and a variety of other enforcement methods, there is no
doubt that they have less leverage over judgment-proof firms.
This generic discussion of judgment-proof defendants is largely
applicable to growers, but some caveats are necessary. First, this
discussion is necessarily theoretical. There are no good data on how many
growers are actually judgment-proof. Second, individual growers may
have incentives to avoid accidents that the abstract judgment-proof firm
above does not. Because CAFO farming is capital intensive, most growers
incur long-term debt to construct a facility, making shutting down an
unattractive option. Even if environmental regulators impose affordable
16 id.
16 5See, e.g., ENvTL. PROT. AGENCY, INTERIM REVISED CLEAN WATER ACT SETTLEMENT
PENALTY POLICY (1995) ("EPA should not seek a penalty that would seriously jeopardize
the violator's ability to continue operations and achieve compliance, unless the violator's
behavior has been exceptionally culpable, recalcitrant, threatening to human health or the
environment, or the violator refuses to comply"), available at http://www.epa.gov/EPA-
WATER/1995/May/Day-04/pr-108.html. comply").
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fines for an accident, a grower may also reasonably fear that the negative
publicity from an enforcement action could lead an integrator to cancel the
contract regardless of whether the integrator is liable for the accident. A
grower may well also wish to remain in the business for personal reasons,
such as commitment to that way of life. However, it is still reasonable to
assume that at least some growers are virtually judgment-proof and that
the reduced threat of penalties will likely make at least some judgment-
proof growes less careful than they would be if they had more to lose.
In sum, when integrators have significant or total market
power, there are two effects on accident prevention: (1) integrator liability
is needed because many growers will be judgment proof, and (2)
integrator liability will be effective because integrators will benefit from
accident prevention and will have the power to demand that growers
change their behavior.
Imposing integrator liability might have other effects as well.
Imposing liability on integrators might cause them to forego production
and marketing contracts and instead raise animals themselves. From a
strictly environmental standpoint, complete vertical integration would not
necessarily be a bad thing. It would, after all, make the meat industry look
more like the hazardous waste or chemical industries did before
corporations started divesting hazardous operations to avoid liability. It
would be easier to police violations by a few integrators than by many
smaller companies. It would be more efficient to bring one large
enforcement action against an integrator than many smaller actions against
its growers. Finally, it would be more effective to threaten penalties
against a deep-pocket defendant than against a judgment-proof one. 167
166 Vukina, supra note 150, at 147-48. Vukina argues that one reason potentially liable
integrators would cease contracting it that is much harder for an integrator to monitor and
measure how well a grower is doing at reducing environmental risk than to determine
how well a grower is doing at raising animals. Id. Growers would therefore have an
incentive to devote too much of their efforts to growing animals and not enough to
avoiding environmental liability. Id. Faced with that problem, integrators might prefer to
raise their own animals, giving them full control over environmental performance. Id.
167 This article focuses on the effects market structure and manipulation can have on
environmental regulation, but this point demonstrates the opposite phenomenon:
environmental regulation and enforcement can affect market structure.
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B. The Effect of Market Reforms on Environmental Compliance by
CAFOs
Reducing integrators' market power could have positive
environmental effects. It could help improve regulators' ability to
effectively prevent accidents by decreasing the numbers of judgment-
proof growers. Increasing growers' market power by facilitating collective
bargaining might enable growers to shield themselves from integrator
pressure to take environmental shortcuts.
Market correction, however, would not likely be as effective a way
to improve environmental performance as integrator liability would, for
several reasons. First, although regulators would regain some leverage
over the now more-profitable growers, that gain would not be as great as
that which the leverage regulators would gain using integrator liability.
That is because even a moderately profitable CAFO could not afford to
pay a penalty that truly reflects the amount of environmental damage a
major spill can cause. Only integrator liability, therefore, can produce a
level of care that is appropriate to the actual risk of harm posed by major
accidents.
A second reason why market correction might be a less desirable
environmental solution than integrator liability is that integrators with an
incentive to prevent CAFO accidents might be more effective enforcers
than regulators. It is possible that an integrator will be more familiar than
regulators are with the risks at the operations with which it contracts,
especially if all the CAFOs have been designed to its uniform
specifications. More importantly, integrators have some "enforcement"
tools that are more powerful than the government's. An integrator who
finds that a particular grower is not taking sufficient care to avoid
accidents might simply refuse to do business with that grower, a reason
that would certainly be supportable under the generous "legitimate
business reason" standard under the Packers & Stockyards Act.168
Regulators cannot so easily close an unsafe grower down. A risk-averse
integrator could theoretically use its contracts to prescribe precise safety
precautions that go beyond what the regulations require.
A final reason market correction is a less desirable approach to
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environmental protection is that market correction does not offer the
enforcement efficiencies that come with being able to focus on a few
integrators instead of a great many growers. Regulators do not have the
resources to closely monitor all the CAFOs who will need Clean Water
Act permits under the new regulations. Moreover, even when an inspector
visits a CAFO, it can be difficult to detect violations because certain kinds
of violations occur irregularly and because other potential violations, such
as land application in excess of agronomic rates, may be hard to discover.
Shared liability helps alleviate that concern by providing a second level of
monitoring. 69
Correcting the balance of market power is just one of the proposed
ways to correct the market problems in the meat industry. What impact, if
any, might the other class of proposals-prohibiting unfair behavior by
integrators-have on environmental protection? Some of the proposals in
Section III.B.2., above, such as prohibiting confidentiality in contracting,
are aimed at correcting the information imbalance. Like directly reducing
market power through antitrust, improving growers' access to information
would be better than nothing from the environmental perspective, but not
as good as integrator liability. Banning packer ownership of livestock until
shortly before slaughter, however, might actually increase pollution. By
preventing integrators from owning and operating their own CAFOs, bans
on packer ownership could lead integrators to outsource the raising of
animals to judgment-proof growers, making it more difficult for regulators
to control environmental performance.
One final question: what would be the environmental effect of
implementing both integrator liability and market reforms? Is there any
inconsistency between them? To some degree, reducing integrators'
market power would work at cross purposes with the imposition of
integrator liability. As discussed above, integrator liability is most
effective as a method of environmental control when integrators have the
market power to control grower behavior; market reforms that reduce
integrator market power will, therefore, lessen the effectiveness of
integrator liability. That does not mean, though, that the two approaches
are fundamentally inconsistent. No market reform will completely remove
integrators' ability to shape grower behavior.
169 See also Ogishi, Animal Waste Policy, supra note 127.
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The various market reforms aimed at correcting unfair conduct
could have differing effects. Prohibiting contract confidentiality would
help regulators and environmentalists monitor the extent to which
integrators are using contracting to affect the degree of care growers use;
that market reform would thus be a valuable addition to integrator liability
as a way to improve environmental performance. Other reforms could
clash with integrator liability. Reforms such as Minnesota's Agricultural
Commodities Contracts Act of 1990, which prohibits the cancellation of a
production contract until the grower has recaptured his or her investment
in production facilities, would severely curtail integrators' ability to
require more care, so extending that reform to other states might be
undesirable to environmental regulators and activists if integrator liability
had already been imposed.
Conclusion
The forgoing discussion leads to a number of recommendations.
First, since the appropriateness of imposing integrator liability depends on
the degree of integrators' market power, and since their degree of market
power varies locally and regionally,17 0 integrator liability might be more
effectively imposed on the state, not the federal, level. There appears to be
greater chance that integrator liability might actually be imposed in such
states. It is states like Maryland, in which integrators appear to hold
significant market power, that some experiments with making integrators
responsible for pollution have occurred.
Second, integrator liability can be limited to liability for manure
spills, for that is the only area in which it is necessary. No co-permitting
proposal has ever attempted to make that distinction. Maryland's proposal
to make integrators partially responsible for manure disposal did address
itself to only one aspect of CAFO pollution, but it was the wrong aspect
because integrators with market power already have a financial incentive
to make sure their growers avoid penalties for improper manure
application.
Third, to the extent that imposing integrator liability is politically
infeasible, environmentalists should lend their support to economic
170 See Vukina, supra note 150, at 148.
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proposals aimed at increasing the bargaining power of CAFOs.171
Although there is no way to predict with certainty the extent to which
those reforms would be effective, economic theory suggests that reducing
integrators' market power would lessen the problem of judgment-proof
growers, enabling regulators to more effectively pressure growers to
prevent accidents. Environmentalists who detest CAFOs may balk at
helping them but should do so nonetheless.
Finally, while the question of integrator liability is important in its
own right, the analysis in this article is applicable beyond the CAFO
context, in other industries-such as the chemical industry and the
hazardous-waste-disposal industry-in which a large, deep-pocketed
company contracts with a small one to engage in a pollution-generating
activity. In such circumstances, regulators and enforcers should recognize
that whether it is good policy to make the large company jointly liable for
violations depends at least in part on whether violations are intentional or
accidental and on whether the large company has market power.
17' Although environmentalists and agricultural reformers share an interest in this respect,
political realities might prevent them from forming an alliance of convenience. Hard-line
environmentalists tend to object to CAFOs as a method of raising meat; expecting them
to support CAFO operators, even in a dispute with big agriculture, might be unrealistic.
Growers, meanwhile, could not be expected to argue that market intervention would
protect the environment, given the underlying rationale that growers can only be trusted
to assiduously guard against spills if they are sufficiently profitable. As discussed above,
moreover, they have tended to oppose integrator liability for several reasons, including
the threat that it would cause integrators to quit contracting and grow their animals
themselves.
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